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Abstract 
We develop an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations taking into account important characteristics of 
the developing countries: high public external debt and large informal sector. We show that an increasing of the public 
external debt has two opposite effects. On the one hand, it enhances growth through a positive externality affecting the 
productivity of private firms. On the other hand, it inhibits growth by ousting the external financing of private firms 
and enlarging the less efficient informal sector. These two effects generate a non-linear effect of the public external 
debt on growth and an optimal share of the public external indebtedness. We also show that, under a certain condition, 
the enlargement of the informal sector could be accompanied by higher growth.
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     1. Introduction
There is general acceptance amongst economists that good policies and good insti-
tutions are required for the design of a viable strategy of economic development. For
Acemoglu et al., (2002, 2004) the degree of institutional development is a fundamental
factor of economic development and poor macroeconomic policies are the symptoms of
poor institutions. The eﬀectiveness of external aid/debt in ﬁnancing the economic de-
velopment process is one of the active research areas where the role of institutions is
emphasized. Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) show that the impact of aid on economic
growth depends on the quality of institutions and policies. Imbs and Ranciere (2005)
found that countries with good policies and good institutions have lower debt overhang.
The international ﬁnancial institutions are designing technical assistance and capacity-
building programs to enhance the management of the external aid/debt in the developing
countries (Bangura et al., 2000).
The management of the external debt is particularly important for developing coun-
tries accumulating large stock of debt since the 1970s. Indeed, their debt burden is so
severe that they carry costly macroeconomic reforms in order to pay the debt principal
and services. In order for the external debt management to be eﬃcient we need a deep
understanding of the of the external debt eﬀect on economic growth. It is insuﬃcient
to draw policy recommendation focusing only on the external debt/GDP ratio. In this
paper we take into consideration two fundamental aspects of the developing countries
not enough stressed in the existing literature. The ﬁrst aspect is the high public external
indebtedness. The second aspect is the informal economy1.
From the theoretical models we know that the external debt has a negative eﬀect on
growth when the debt stock exceeds the reasonable thresholds. The most well known
explanation of this eﬀect was established by the theory of excessive debt (debt overhang)
through the studies of Krugman (1988), Sachs (1989) and Cohen (1992). This the-
ory establishes that beyond a certain threshold, external debt aﬀects growth negatively
through decelerating the dynamic of factors’ accumulation and declining the total factor
productivity. The ﬁrst explanation is that when external debt is excessive, investors
anticipating a gradual tax increase for future debt repayment reduce their investment
which in turn slows down capital accumulation. The second explanation is related to
the governments’ decision not to carry out costly economic reforms, considering that fu-
ture higher domestic production will serve only foreign creditors. This weakness in the
economic environment aﬀects capital allocation and investment quality and hence slows
down total factor productivity. Relatively to the above studies, our paper presents a the-
oretical model stressing the importance of a neglected channel in the literature of debt
and growth: the sensitivity of the informal economy to the external debt management.
The proposed model is an endogenous growth one with overlapping generations where
investors have to choose between formal projects and less eﬃcient informal ones. It shows
that a misallocation of the external debt between the government and the private formal
sector could reduce the economic growth through two channels. The ﬁrst channel is a
reduction of private sector productivity. The second channel is a reduction of capital
accumulation associated with an enlarging of the informal sector. The fact that a large
1Chickering and Salahdine (1991) argue that for the majority of developing countries, the informal
sector contributes for 35% to 65% to the total employment and produces between 20% and 40% of GDP.
According to Friedman and al. (2000) the size of the informal sector is approximately 68% in Egypt,
39% in Malaysia, 76% in Nigeria, 71% in Thailand, 45% in Tunisia, etc.
1informal sector is associated with lower growth rates is widely accepted in the literature
(Loayza, 1997; Johnson et al., 1999 and Schneider and Enste, 2000). We show that this
is not always the case and we identify a case where an enlargement of the informal sector
is accompanied by higher growth.
The rest of the paper is organized in three main sections. Section 2 presents the
theoretical framework. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀect of the external public debt on the
size of the formal/informal sector. Section 4 investigates the eﬀect of the external public
debt on growth through diﬀerent channels. Finally section 5 concludes and gives some
policy implications.
2. An endogenous growth model
2.1 Economic environment
We consider an economy with an inﬁnite, discrete time horizon, t =0 ,1,2,... Date
t corresponds to the beginning of period t +1and the end of period t. The economy is
endowed with two production sectors with diﬀerent technologies. The ﬁrst sector produces
a ﬁnal (or consumption) good using capital and labour. The second sector produces an
investment (or capital) good with the ﬂow of capitals (wages) generated by the production
of the ﬁnal good. At each date a new generation of two-periods living agents of mass 1
is born. An initial generation of old agents coexists with young agents at date t =0 .
The old of the ﬁrst generation are endowed at t =0with a stock k0 of capital good. All
agents are endowed with one unit of labour which they supply during their ﬁrst-period
of live inelastically at no disutility cost. In compensation for their work (when young)
in the ﬁnal good sector, they earn a wage which is invested during the second period in
order to maximize the ﬁnal wealth which ﬁnances their consumption. Two investment
opportunities are available for each young agent after receiving its wage: undertaking
a formal or an informal investment project (producing the investment good). A formal
project is eligible for a complementary external ﬁnancing but is taxable. However, the
informal project is self-ﬁnanced, non-taxable and supports a cost of tax evasion.
Final good sector
This sector is composed of competitive ﬁrms producing the ﬁnal good instantaneously
from the combination of two substitutable factors: capital (good) K and labour L.T h e
technology which is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas type exhibits constant factors’ return
but includes an aggregate level of "knowledge" denoted A w h i c hi sc o m m o nt oa l lﬁrms
and is considered as a free public good: Yt = AtKα
t L
1−α
t . We associate (à la Romer, 1986)
At to the aggregate stock of capital 2 : At = k
1−α
t . This choice enables the endogenous
growth of the aggregate production. Hence, the per capita output is given by yt = kt.
The output is entirely distributed to the workers and to the entrepreneurs producing the
capital good. Finally, capital depreciates fully after production and the factor’s prices
are equal to their marginal productivities:
ρt = αAt(kt)
α−1
wt =( 1 − α)At(kt)
α
2The choice of this technology is common in the literature(Bose and Cohtern (1996))
2In the equilibrium the aggregate stock of capital is also the capital stock per capita:
kt = kt. Hence, we obtain
ρt = α
wt =( 1 − α)kt (1)
Agents’ investment decisions
The agent supplies, inelastically at no disutility cost, a unit of labour during its
ﬁrst-period of live. Hence, the total labor supply in each period is L =1 .I nr e t u r n ,
he earns a wage wt which he invests during the second period in order to maximize its
ﬁnal consumption. Indeed, to simplify the model we assume consumption occurs only
at the end of the second period. Under this assumption there is no trade-oﬀ between
consumption and saving at the end of the ﬁrst period. The only trade-oﬀ we consider
in this model is between investing in a formal project or in informal one. It can be
a formal project or an informal one. Whatever the project’s type is, investment good is
produced using a linear technology transforming any quantity q of the ﬁnal good in (agt)q
investment good with a>1.T h et e r mgt denotes the amount of public expenditures per
capita which increases the productivity of the two types of projects3.
Undertaking a formal project: When undertaking a formal project, an agent can
obtain an external ﬁnancing of d
f
t in terms of the ﬁn a lg o o d .T h i sa m o u n ti sl e n tb y
international investors (through a domestic ﬁnancial intermediary) in return of a gross
interest rate denoted r. Therefore, the total amount invested in the formal project is
wt + d
f










This quantity is sold to the ﬁnal sector at the price α w h i c hp r o v i d e st h ea g e n ta ni n c o m e
ακ
f







t and his net proﬁt after paying the tax τt is (1 − τt) π
f
t+1.
Undertaking an informal project: An agent who undertakes an informal project
has no access to the external ﬁnancing and don’t pay the tax on proﬁt. He produces a
quantity of the investment good given by
κ
j
t+1 = agtwt (3)












t+1 represents the cost of informality. This
cost can be related to the masking of the activity through paying bribes or localization
far from urban area which exposes the agent to more risks and high transport costs. The
agents are heterogenous relatively to this cost which is assumed to vary proportionally
to the production c
j
t+1 =( 1− θj)κ
j
t+1. The parameter θj is speciﬁc to each agent and is
distributed uniformly on [0,1].T h i ss i g n i ﬁes that agents who support very low cost of
informality have a high value of θj (at the extreme no such cost if θj =1 ). Therefore, the











3One can think about the quality of public services, infrastructure, etc.
4Note that the agent has no incentive to borrow if the cost of capital is superior to its project return
or equivalently αagt <r .
3Agents’ decisions: Each agent chooses the type of his project maximizing proﬁt.
Hence, at date t the informal projects are realized by the agents characterized by θj such
that π
j
t+1 ≥ (1 −τt) π
f
t+1. Using the above expression of the proﬁts we obtain the set of
















The set Θ of formal entrepreneurs includes agents who support suﬃciently high cost
of informality and for who more interesting to undertake a formal projects
Θ = {j such that θj ∈ [0,θ t]}. Hence, if the threshold θt is equal to one5,t h e r ei sn o
informal projects in the economy during period t +1 .N o t et h a tw ec a ni n t e r p r e tθt as
the size of the formal sector and 1 − θt as the size of the informal one.
Government
At the beginning of period t +1 ,w ed e n o t eDt the stock of (inherited) external debt
( i nt e r m so ft h et r a d a b l eg o o d ) . T h ee c o n o m yr a i s e san e wl i n eo fe x t e r n a ld e b to fa n
amount d. The government controls the allocation of the external debt in the economy.
It allocates a proportion λt to ﬁnance its expenditures gt and a proportion 1 − λt to the
ﬁnancing of the private sector (formal investment projects) so we have
gt = d
g
t = λtd (6)
d
f
t =( 1− λt)d
3. External debt and Informality
The size of the formal sector deﬁned by (5) can be written equivalently using (6)












This expression shows that an increase of the external public debt share (λt)t ot h e
detriment of the private (formal) sector has an ambiguous eﬀect on the size of the formal
sector. In one hand, it increases the public expenditures which induces positive externality
and increases the project productivity. By this channel, its aﬀects positively the size of
the formal sector, since more agents will have incentive to quit the informal sector seeing
that the return of the formal project increases relatively to the cost of external borrowing.





. In the other hand, it reduces the
amount of external ﬁnancing to formal projects which tend to diminish the size of the
formal sector. This eﬀect is captured through the term (1 − λt).




i) The size of the formal sector is a concave function of the public external debt share.
ii) The size of the formal sector is maximal θt for a share of the public external debt
given by λt =m i n ( 1 ,
p r







iii) The size of the formal sector decreases with the tax rate.
Proof: It is straightforward using (7) and diﬀerentiating θt relatively to τt to obtain ∂θt
∂τt <















Figure 1 illustrates the case λt < 1 and shows how the size of the formal sector θt
varies when the external public debt share λt and the tax rate τt vary. As it can be
noted, the eﬀect of external public debt share (λt) on the size of the formal sector is non
linear and depends on the taxation rate. An increase of λt improves the size of the formal
sector when the positive eﬀect of an increase in the government expenditures exceeds the
negative eﬀect due to a decrease in the external ﬁnancing to formal projects. The turning
point after which any increase in the external public debt share induces a smaller formal
sector is λt.
4. External debt and Growth
In this section we will explain how the allocation of the external debt between private
formal sector and government expenditure aﬀects economic growth. For period t+1,t h e
growth factor Gt+1 is deﬁned by yt+1/yt or equivalently using (1) kt+1/kt.The quantity of
the capital (investment) good available at t +1i st h es u mo ft h eo u t p u to ft h ef o r m a l
projects θtκ
f






























Hence, using the expression of (3) of wt, the growth factor is given by
Gt+1 = a(1 − α)dλth(θt,λ t) (10)
The relationship between the external debt and growth is summarized by the following
proposition.
5Proposition 2







2) The growth is a concave function of the external public debt share in the following
cases
i) wt ≥ d
ii) wt <d and λt < λt
iii) wt <dand λt ≥ λt if τt <τ ∗
t where τ∗
tdepending only on r
αa, d and w.
Proof: See the appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the eﬀect of the external public debt
share on economic growth. This conﬁgurations are derived from proposition 2 and others
characteristics detailed in its proof. Among these conﬁgurations, note that (c) (corres-
ponding to the cases ii and iii of proposition 2) and (d) (corresponding to the cases i and
ii) are the most economically acceptables. As we showed in proposition 1, when λt > λt,
an increase in the external public debt share λt diminishes the size of the formal sector.






,t h i sn e g a t i v ee ﬀect is dominated by
the positive eﬀect of higher externalities generated by the increase of public expenditures.
Therefore, the resulting eﬀect is positive and there is an increase in growth although the
informal sector widens. Graphs (a) and (b) illustrate two possible conﬁgurations where
t h eg r o w t hf u n c t i o ni sc o n c a v eo n l yf o rλt < λt (case ii) and in a neighbourhood of unity
(denoted N(1)). The conﬁgurations (a) and (b) are economically diﬃcult to interpret
since they show that the resulting eﬀect becomes positive again in a third region. The




We proposed an endogenous growth model with nested generations taking into ac-
count an important characteristics of the developing countries: the high public indebted-
ness and the informal sector. We show that an increasing of the public external debt has
two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, it enhances growth through a positive externality
aﬀecting the productivity of private ﬁrms. On the other hand, it inhibits growth by re-
ducing the capital accumulation dynamic. Indeed, higher public debt ousts the external
ﬁnancing of private projects and makes the informel sector more attractive for entre-
preneurs with lower cost of tax evasion. The enlargement of the less eﬃcient informal
sector reduces the capital accumulation dynamic. These two eﬀects generate a non-linear
eﬀect of the public external debt on growth and an optimal share of the public external
indebtness. Interestingly, it is also shown that, under certain condition, the enlargement
of the informal sector could be accompanied by higher growth. This is the case when
t h er e d u c t i o no ft h ef o r m a ls e c t o rs i z ei sm o r et h a nc o m p e n s a t e db yt h ep r o d u c t i v i t y
increase of its remaining ﬁrms. By means of the results outlined in this paper we argue
that the external debt management in developing countries should take in account not
6only the classic debt/GDP ratio but has to be designed according to the optimal alloc-
ation between public sector versus private sector. This optimal allocation depends on
the structural characteristics of each economy. Chieﬂy ,p o l i c ym a k e r sh a v et oc o n s i d e r
the sensitivity of the informal sector size when implementing a strategy to reduce their
external indebtedness.
7Appendix
Figure 1:T h ee ﬀect of the external public debt share on the formal sector size
An illustration of proposition 1
8Figure 2:T h ee ﬀect of the external public debt share on growth
An illustration of proposition 2.
9P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2
From (10) the maximal growth is obtained for λ
∗
t maximizing f(λ)=λh(θ(λ),λ)
which is not necessarily λ.We have ∂G
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dλ2 < 0 and the function
df





























































λ=1.W eh a v eg(1) = 1
2 and g(0) = 1− d
w ≥ 0.










λ=1 > 0 and
we obtain f(λ) <f(1) for every λ. We conclude that growth is maximal for λ
∗ =1> λ.
10** Case d>w
W es h o wu s i n g( 1 3 )t h a ti te x i s t sτ∗ ∈ ]0,1[ depending only on r







> 0 if τ>τ ∗
≤ 0 if τ ≤ τ∗ (14)
We have
df
















































αaw and v =
√







λ=λ ≥ 0 which






value of f and therefore the growth factor. The concavity/convexity of f determines
the position of λ



















λ =0 . Therefore,
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